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enhancement (such as steroid usage and certain cosmetic surgeries), 13 and human embryonic stem cell research.
14 Critics, however, note that "yuck factor" arguments are, by their very nature, anti-intellectual in that such arguments allow their proponents to eschew logic in favor of an appeal to emotion. 15 Moreover, critics voice concerns that feelings-based policymaking in the field of biotechnology could lead to discriminatory policymaking in other areas that those currently wielding power find to be personally distasteful. 16 The same repugnant sentiment that accompanies Gladys Scott's kidneyliberty exchange has been noted by those who oppose systems that would allow living donors to sell their organs to prospective donees. 17 However, critics of living donor organ sales have developed their arguments well beyond "yuck" or unreasoned repugnance, contending that under such creation of a human-animal chimera as a "yuck factor" response).
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See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 74 (2004) (arguing that disgust is "of dubious reliability . . . in the life of the law"); Chester, supra note 8, at 594 (characterizing "yuck factor" arguments as "weak" responses to the utility of reproductive cloning); Greely, supra note 13, at 1153-54 (criticizing "yuck factor" arguments in the context of human biological enhancements as lacking "intellectual meat"); Sherringham, supra note 12, at 776 (urging that, in the context of human-animal chimera creation, "yuck factor"-based criticism is insufficiently persuasive unless coupled with a reasoned explanation of the reaction); Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity: Conservative Bioethics' Latest, Most Dangerous Ploy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 2008, http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/The%20Stupidity%20of%20 Dignity.htm (critiquing Leon Kass's theory regarding the "wisdom of repugnance" on the grounds that the notion of human dignity propounded by Kass is "a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it").
16.
See Deckha, supra note 11, at 52 (" [T] he danger of listening to a 'yuck' response resides in the fact that prejudices and hegemonic norms may cultivate that response."); John Kunich, The Tears of a Clone: The Unintended Consequences of Bans on Cloning, 25 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 196 (2004) (arguing that using the "yuck factor" as a basis for banning human cloning can "lead to erosions of other cherished personal liberties and rights").
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These critics usually couch their opposition in terms of forgoing commodification in favor of preserving human dignity. See, e.g., Cynthia B. Cohen, Public Policy and the Sale of Human Organs, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 48-49, 58 (2002) (arguing that the payment of organ donors would constitute a "deni [al] of embodied human dignity . . . would violate a fundamental conviction . . . that we should not treat human beings . . . as commodities"); Francis L. Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives-Not Payment-for Organ Donation, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2002 (2002 (likening the sale of human organs to prostitution). In addition to critics of living donor sales, there are also a host of critics of sales of cadaveric organs. However, cadaveric sales are not within the scope of this Article. The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] systems healthy poor people who lack the information necessary to give informed consent will be coerced by the ailing rich into selling their organs. 18 They further urge that these organ vendors will ultimately be disadvantaged physically and financially. 19 Critics also note the potential vendor's loss (or partial loss) of an organ, for which she may not have received adequate medical care, and the desperation that may have caused her to misrepresent her eligibility to donate in order to reap the perceived financial benefits of donating, as among the hazards of living donor sales. 20 However, the "yuck factor" engendered by Governor Barbour's grant of conditional release appears to be based upon its coercive nature. 21 As noted, those who disfavor organ sales argue that those lacking financial means will be forced into selling their body parts to the highest bidder. 22 In the Scott Sisters' case, coercion takes the form of the powerful, white, male Governor of Mississippi requiring an imprisoned Black 23 woman to forfeit an organ in order to secure her freedom and that of her sister.
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What happens if the Scott Sisters' story is replicated-if it is multiplied 18 .
See Delmonico et al., supra note 17, at 2005 ("[A] poor person feels compelled to risk death for the sole purpose of obtaining monetary payment for a body part."). India, 288 JAMA 1589 , 1591 (2002 'Y NEPHROLOGY 1133 'Y NEPHROLOGY , 1133 'Y NEPHROLOGY (2006 ("In a vending system, in which regard for the recipient is divorced from the motivation for donation, powerful financial incentives for a donor not to be forthcoming about critical information could affect both their own health and that of the recipient . . . ."). But see Taylor & Simmerling, supra note 19, at 58 (advocating that proper screening will eliminate donor deception regarding eligibility).
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See infra Part III.A (noting the Scott Sisters' relative powerlessness as compared to Barbour and the "yuck factor" engendered by the convergence of Jamie's need for a kidney with Barbour's political aspirations).
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This Article uses the capitalized term "Black" when referring to people of African descent individually or collectively because "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun." Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 , 1332 n.2 (1988 . It follows then that this Article does not capitalize "white," "which is not a proper noun, since whites do not constitute a specific cultural group." Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 , 1244 n.6 (1991 .
24.
Gov. Barbour's Statement Regarding Release of Scott Sisters, supra note 1.
across prison populations? If programs were put into place that allowed prison inmates to trade their kidneys (or portions of their lungs, livers, or pancreases) for liberty, it follows that the "yuck factor" would be multiplied exponentially. However, it must be noted that in devising his peculiar condition of release, Governor Barbour chose a course of action that was, ironically, unobjectionable to the civil rights community (including the state's Black activist community) that was clamoring for the release of the Scott Sisters. 25 The Scott Sisters' clemency case is particularly intriguing in that civil rights activists cheered, rather than crying, "Yuck!" and objecting to the terms of release imposed by the Governor. 26 The outcry from some bioethicists notwithstanding, this scenario begs the question of why we should not allow other prisoners-those to whom serendipity has not provided an ailing sister-to do the same and whether it is in fact possible to do so while avoiding, or at least mitigating repugnance.
This Dec. 31, 2010) , http://www.naacp.org/blog/entry/statement-by-benjamin-todd-jealous-on-therelease-of-the-scott-sisters/ (praising the local NAACP chapter, the local Black newspaper, the Jackson Advocate, a "whole family of civil and human rights organizations," and a "chorus of activists" for their efforts in seeking the release of the Scott Sisters).
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See MAYO CLINIC PROC. 414, 417 (2011) . The lack of pushback from the general public in Mississippi may in part stem from claims by both the governor and Gladys Scott that she had previously volunteered to donate her kidney to Jamie. Id. See discussion infra Part I (regarding the importance of whether Gladys actually did volunteer).
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National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 273-74 (2004) . National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, tit. 3, §301, 98 Stat. 2346 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006) ). The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] consideration" 28 should include an exception that would allow state and federal prison inmates to donate organs in exchange for release or credit toward release. Such a stance surely raises questions regarding whether the State would be coercing the forfeiture of body parts as punishment or in exchange for freedom. Moreover, critics may question the potential effects on the criminal justice system including the permissibility or legality of allowing those facing incarceration to bargain their bodies, and conceivably their long-term health, in exchange for reduced prison terms. It must also be noted that "yuck factor" arguments have been used by proponents of the altruistic organ donation system codified by NOTA as one of the bases for keeping the altruistic system in place rather than allowing any measure of consideration to be given to donors.
29
Conceivably, such an inmate organ donation program is only feasible if a system is devised to remove the "yuck factor" by eliminating coercion from the equation and by addressing the other concerns that mirror those addressed in the living donor sales debate. Such a program would need to reframe the legal context in which the Scott Sisters' clemency condition was crafted into one in which a great measure of power and choice resides instead in the hands of the inmate participants. An exception to NOTA's valuable consideration prohibition could also serve to modernize our current altruistic organ donation policy into one that may allow for future flexibility in responding to needs of both potential donors and donees.
Part I of this Article discusses the legality of the clemency condition imposed upon Gladys Scott. Part II frames the background of the Scott Sisters/Haley Barbour narrative, specifically focusing on the interplay of the parties' particular histories with Professor Derrick Bell's theory of interest convergence. Finally, in Part III, this Article proposes a framework for a program wherein inmates may be able to exchange organs for liberty without triggering a "yuck factor" response. 
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Id. The data related herein regarding those on the kidney transplant waiting list does not include those individuals who are waiting for a kidney along with another organ.
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Sally Satel, Introduction, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS 1, 5 (Sally Satel ed., 2008).
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OPTN, supra note 30 (follow "Build Advanced" on side bar; then in
Step 1 (choose a data category) choose "Waiting List"; in Step 2 (choose report columns), choose "Waiting Time" and leave other options under Step 2 blank; in Step 3 (choose report rows), choose "Ethnicity" and leave other options under Step 3 blank; in Step 4 (chose your style), choose display "Counts" and choose desired format; in the "Optional" section, choose organ "Kidney," choose count "Candidates" and leave other categories blank).
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The statistics for Black ESRD patients are even more alarming than the overall national data. Blacks represent only thirteen percent of the United States population, 38 but, disproportionately, represent approximately thirty percent of those on the kidney waiting list. 39 The number of Black patients who have been hoping for a kidney for two years or more and three years or more are fifty-three percent and thirty-six percent respectively. 40 Blacks who are on the kidney waiting list also die at a rate averaging approximately 1,500 people per year-a number that represents thirty-eight percent of all kidney waiting list deaths. 41 The number of Mississippians anticipating an organ transplant is quite small relative to the rest of the nation: 215 individuals. 42 These patients are almost exclusively in need of kidneys. 43 Black Mississippians are more disproportionately represented on that state's kidney transplant waiting list than nationally, as approximately three-quarters of Mississippi's ESRD patients on the kidney waiting list are Black. 44 Blacks, however, make up only thirty-seven percent of Mississippi's total population. 45 Given these statistics, it is hardly surprising that three-quarters of those who died in
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41.
Id. (follow "National Data" on side bar; then choose category "Waiting List Removals"; choose organ "Kidney"; choose count "Candidates"; choose "Death Removals by Ethnicity by Year").
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Id. (follow "State Data" on side bar; then chose Mississippi; choose category "Waiting List"; choose count "Candidates"; choose "Overall by Organ").
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Of the 215 waiting list patients in Mississippi, 195 are waiting for kidneys; the remaining twenty are waiting for a heart transplant. Id. (follow "State Data" on side bar; then choose Mississippi; choose category "Waiting List"; chose count "Candidates"; choose "Overall by Organ").
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See, e.g., Delmonico et al., supra note 17 (comparing the sale of human organs to prostitution).
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54.
42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2). The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] agencies, and other medical industry providers to receive payment for their services. 55 Donors, on the other hand, are only allowed to recoup certain losses: "the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor . . . in connection with the donation of the organ."
56
Despite the lack of a concrete definition of "valuable consideration" under Section 301, it has been widely accepted that not only are direct cash payments to donors prohibited, but that a wide range of donor incentives are also violate NOTA. Therefore, when scholars and policy-makers have proposed various incentive regimes aimed at increasing the number of organ donors, those proposals have usually been made with an eye toward amending Section 301 to expand the list of that which does not amount to valuable consideration. 57 These proposed incentives have included college scholarships, 58 housing, 59 and the payment of household bills.
60
Additionally, federal lawmakers have tried unsuccessfully to provide living organ donors with tax credits, life insurance policies, and guaranteed unpaid medical leave in exchange for their donations.
61 State legislative efforts have largely mirrored those of their federal counterparts both in their tactics and in their overall failure to mitigate organ shortages.
62 One notable exception is South Carolina's failed effort at instituting an inmate organ-for-liberty exchange.
63 However, unlike Barbour, the proponents of the measure in South Carolina recognized the danger that such an exchange may have run
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Linford, supra note 57, at 267.
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Goodwin, supra note 57, at 617.
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Chad Thompson, supra note 47, . But see Organ Donor Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 106-56, 113 Stat. 407 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1999)) (providing federal employees with seven days' paid leave for donating bone marrow and thirty days of paid leave for donating organs).
62.
See Chad Thompson, supra note 47, at 140.
63.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
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afoul of NOTA.
64
C. Liberty as "Valuable Consideration" Under Section 301 of NOTA
When questioned about the legality of his kidney donation condition, Governor Barbour noted that Gladys Scott volunteered to donate her kidney to her sister and that Gladys's offer weighed favorably in his decision to grant clemency to them. 65 The Governor's spokesperson denied that the exchange may have been illegal and instead pointed to Gladys's petition to the parole board in which she indicated her willingness to donate.
66 Gladys Scott even publicly claimed that it was her idea to donate her kidney to Jamie and that she would have done so willingly, even without the promise of freedom. 67 This Article argues that one may therefore surmise that both Gladys and the Governor thought that the potential issue of valuable consideration (to the extent that they were aware of the issue) was meaningless because Gladys actually wanted to give a kidney to Jamie. Whether Gladys volunteered to donate her kidney to Jamie is immaterial to whether a violation of NOTA occurred. 68 Rather, in order to decide whether Barbour violated NOTA, one must determine whether Gladys is to receive
64.
See Jenny Jarvie, Inmates Could Trade an Organ for an Early Out, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4464503 (reporting that legislators would refrain from debating the bill until they were able to determine whether the reduced sentences contemplated by the measure constituted "'valuable consideration'").
65.
See Scott Sisters Freed From Prison, CLARION-LEDGER, Jan. 8, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 452375 (quoting the Governor as saying, "(Gladys) [sic] asked for the opportunity to give her sister a kidney and we're making that opportunity available to her").
66.
See Organ Transplant Is Sister's Key to Freedom, supra note 6 (quoting Barbour's spokesman, Dan Turner, as saying that the idea that Gladys would donate her kidney to Jamie was "some-thing [sic] that she [Gladys] came up with . . . . not an idea the governor's office brokered. It's not a quid pro quo" reporting that Gladys Scott volunteered to donate a kidney to Jamie in her petition for early release).
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See 
84.
Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1349.
85.
Although Singleton was reversed en banc, the reversal was based upon a finding that 18 U.S.C. § 210(c)(2)'s use of the word "whoever" did not apply to government prosecutors. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1299. Left undisturbed was the reasoning that prosecutorial leniency and the liberty that might be derived from it constituted something of value under the statute. 
94.
See Scott Sisters' Mom Plans Homecoming, supra note 26 (reporting that the Scott Sisters' mother Evelyn Rasco credits their release to the five-year long internet campaign that she and then-Loyola Chicago School of Law student Nancy Lockhard waged; Rasco and Lockhard eventually built a network of more than 15,000 supporters across Europe, Africa and North America); see also Williams, supra note 70 ("The effort on behalf of the sisters . . . was first taken up by African-American-themed Internet sites . . . .").
95.
See [16:2013] rates of Black incarceration; for instance, the national incarceration rate is 497 per 100,000. 99 However, the national rate of incarceration of Blacks is over 5.5 times that national rate, at 2290 per 100,000. 100 Mississippi's rate of Black incarceration, at 1742 per 100,000, though lower than the national average, is still more than triple its rate of white incarceration, which hovers at 503 per 100,000.
101
In explaining how such civil rights injustices are remedied, Professor Derrick Bell wrote that "[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites."
102 This provocative principle serves as the foundation for his "interest convergence" theory. 103 The Scott Sisters' story is illustrative of a brief moment of interest convergence. 104 This brief moment, rather than representing a macro-level interest convergence similar to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education 105 cited by Bell, was instead interest convergence on the micro-level in that it affected the interests of just a few: Jamie and Gladys Scott and Governor Haley Barbour. Although merely reflective of "micro-interest convergence," the timing of Barbour's release of Jamie and Gladys Scott gives additional credence to Bell's assertion that "[r]acial justice-or its appearance-may, from time to time, be counted among the interests deemed important by . . . society's policymakers."
106 As demonstrated below, Haley Barbour needed to appear racially tolerant and capable of leading a diverse nation at just the same time that Jamie Scott needed to be released for a life-saving renal transplant. This (Marc Mauer ed., 2005) , available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ sentencing_review.pdf . convergence of the particular interests of Haley Barbour and the Scott Sisters provides a key to answering the question of how Governor Barbour settled upon the kidney donation clemency condition, and how a condition that would normally engender a "yuck factor" response came to be acceptable to the Scott Sisters, their attorneys, and the civil rights community.
99.
Map of Correctional Populations by
B. Prisons and Mississippi's Peculiar Institution
107
The story of the Scott Sisters cannot be fully understood without considering Mississippi's history and the racial background of the protagonists-the Scott Sisters are Black and Barbour is white. More particularly, it cannot be wholly appreciated without exploring the intersection between slavery and the state prison system in Mississippi in the context of both the historical ownership of, and control over, Black bodies. Jamie and Gladys Scott were not imprisoned at Mississippi's notorious Parchman prison farm, nor were they sentenced to labor in the fields. Their story, however-particularly that of the disproportionately harsh sentence meted out to them-is perhaps only comprehensible in light of Mississippi's history. Antebellum Mississippi's economy was built almost entirely upon the exploitation of enslaved Africans. 108 Mississippi was not just a slave-holding state, but was the preeminent slave-holding state in the union in terms of both the numbers of humans held in bondage there and the wealth that they produced for those who owned their bodies and their labor. 109 Shortly before the beginning of the Civil War, Mississippi was the country's leading producer of cotton 110 -a crop that comprised more than half of United States 107. The term "peculiar institution" was "a euphemistic term that white southerners used for slavery . . . [the term's] implicit message was that slavery in the U.S. South was different from the very harsh slave systems existing in other countries and that southern slavery had no impact on those living in northern states." Fletcher M. Green, Peculiar Institution, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401803191.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012 
109.
See STAMPP, supra note 107, at 29-33 (noting that in the 1860s, slaves made up fifty-five percent of the total state population of Mississippi, a statistic that was surpassed only by South Carolina, in which slaves made up fifty-seven percent of the state's population).
110.
Mills, supra note 108, at 154 (noting that, in 1859, Mississippi ginned over 1.2 million 400-pound bales of cotton while Alabama, the next highest-producing state, ginned a mere 990,000 bales). The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] exports of the day. 111 This cash crop was planted, tended, and harvested by Black slaves. 112 Antebellum Mississippi had been a veritable land of opportunity for young white men looking to make their fortunes.
113 Yet, the same agriculturally-dominated economy, built upon racial subjugation, that made Mississippi a land of opportunity and prosperity for whites in the early to mid-nineteenth century, made it no less than backwards in subsequent years. 114 As the United States pressed through the Second Industrial Revolution, Mississippi, like much of the Deep South, clung to its antebellum agricultural roots, including its dependence on exploited Black labor.
115 After the Civil War, Mississippi needed a means of asserting control over its Black population in order to keep it tied to the land and to assure white social and political dominance in the wake of Emancipation.
116
White Mississippians met this need in a two-fold manner, as they effectuated systematic control of Black bodies through both peonage and through the use of prison labor to swell agricultural profit.
117
The system of sharecropping, as practiced in the South after
111.
112.
Id. at 155.
See id. (noting that "[e]
arly Mississippi literature pictures a society driven by lust for quick riches based on the production of cotton").
114.
Id. at 155 ("Hindsight affords us the luxury of condemning a way of life [slavery] which inarguably created many of the social and economic ills we suffer today in Mississippi."). 
115.
See Ron Soodalter, A Blight on the Nation: Slavery in Today's America, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 37, 38-39 (2009) (noting that Southern dependence on the antebellum plantation system caused "peonage slavery" to persist well into the 1960s). But see DAVID J. LIBBY, SLAVERY AND FRONTIER MISSISSIPPI: 1720-1835, at 45-47 (2004) ("[T] he assumption that [cotton] plantation life was 'premodern' or agrarian overlooks both the unrelenting constancy of labor, in contrast to the seasonal breaks in most other agrarian regimes, and the relationship between its product, cotton fiber, and the Industrial Revolution.").
116.
See Soodalter, supra note 115, at 38-39 ("Crops in the South still needed planting, cultivating and harvesting, and there was a vast population of unemployed former slaves. Planters instituted a system that was as close to the old slavery as possible, but with some new wrinkles [referring to peonage].").
117.
See id.
Emancipation, was no more than peonage, or debt bondage. 118 Former slaves invariably found themselves in debt year after year to the planter on whose property they resided.
119 After the crops were harvested, the landowner took his share of the crop's proceeds and deducted the (often inflated) cost of seed and other supplies from the sharecropper's account, usually leaving the sharecropper with a negative balance. 120 As the sharecropper was cash poor, 121 he could only make payment in hope of settling his account, by agreeing to work for the planter for yet another year.
122 Jail was the penalty for nonpayment and death brought no relief, as this burden of debt bondage slavery passed from parent to child, thus binding entire families often to the same plantations on which their ancestors had been slaves.
123
After the Civil War, Mississippi's jails and prisons underwent a sea change.
124 Prior to Emancipation, slave owners punished slaves for their infractions, with no interference from the State. 125 After the war, Mississippi penal institutions no longer housed primarily white offenders; in short order, Mississippi's prison populations became predominantly Black. 126 This explosion in the number of imprisoned Blacks was a direct reflection of whites' desire to control former slaves by either compelling them to return to plantations or by otherwise corralling them.
127 By 1865, the Mississippi legislature had enacted the Mississippi Black Codes-a number of laws aimed at proscribing the freedom of what white Mississippians saw as a free-roaming vagrant Black population. 128 As such, Blacks who could not show proof of employment-i.e., that they worked for a white planter-were
118.
See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) ("[P] eonage is a form of involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. . . ."); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905) ("[Peonage] may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.").
119.
Soodalter, supra note 115, at 39.
120.
121.
Landowners usually issued sharecroppers tickets rather than cash as payment. Id. These tickets were often only accepted at the landowner's store, thus furthering the dependence of Black farm laborers on their former masters. Id.
122.
123.
Id.
124. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 34 (1996) .
125.
126.
127.
Id. at 21.
128.
Id. at 20-22. The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] fined fifty dollars. 129 A freedman's inability to pay the fifty-dollar fine would result in his being hired out-in effect sold to-a white man who was willing to pay the fine in his stead. In these transactions, preference was given to the former master.
130 What began as small-scale hiring out of convicts had grown tremendously by the late 1860s, when the State awarded the first large convict leasing contract under which Black prisoners were sent to work mostly in the cotton fields of the Delta. 131 This leasing program ended in 1904 with the construction of the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi-a penal farm designed to house Black inmates in plantation conditions.
132
As mentioned earlier, Jamie and Gladys Scott were not housed at Parchman.
133 Rather, they were imprisoned at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility (CMCF).
134 CMCF is one of three state prisons in Mississippi and the only one housing female inmates. 135 It is important to note that, in Mississippi, the number of imprisoned women in the state prison system had, until the mid-twentieth century, always been relatively small and limited in its racial composition. 136 As historian David Oshinsky wrote, " [a] The nation experienced a post-Civil Rights Era explosion of its prison population.
138 Prior to the mid-1970s, national incarceration rates hovered around 100 per 100,000.
139 By the time the Scott Sisters were convicted in 1994, rates had more than tripled to 389 per 100,000.
140 When Governor
129.
130.
OSHINSKY, supra note 124, at 21.
131.
Id. at 35-36.
132.
Id. at 52-53, 109. The 1890 Mississippi Constitutional Convention abolished convict leasing effective January 1, 1895, but it took until 1904 for Parchman to be built. Id.
133.
See supra Part II.B.
134.
Gates, supra note 26. (Nov. 13, 2012) , http://www.mdoc.state.ms.us/division_of_institutions%20State%20 Prisons.htm.
MISS. DEP'T OF CORR., DIV. OF INSTS. STATE PRISONS, There Are Three State Prisons in Mississippi,
136.
See OSHINSKY, supra note 124, at 169.
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U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
Online, ALBANY.EDU, http:www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282010.pdf (last visited Jan, 2, 2013).
139.
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Barbour announced the Scott Sisters' release in 2010, the rate had risen to 497 per 100,000. 141 Among women, the increase was even more shocking. The female prison population per 100,000, which had remained in the single digits until the mid-1970s, more than quadrupled to 45 per 100,000 by 1994.
142 By 2010, it was more than ten times the rate that it had been at the end of the Civil Rights Era.
143 Scholars opine that the exponential growth in the prison population and the disproportionate representation of Blacks in that population is a direct reaction to the civil and political gains of the Civil Rights Movement.
144 Not surprisingly then, Blacks have borne the brunt of this expanded carceral regime. Both the national and Mississippi rates of Black incarceration far outstrip those of white incarceration. 145 The same racial disparities that characterize the overall national prison population are also prevalent within the population of imprisoned women, as Black women are incarcerated at three times the rate of white women. 146 Moreover, just as in the 100 year period prior to the end of the Civil Rights Era, the pace of Mississippi's imprisoning of Black women far outstripped that of its imprisoning of white women. Black women make up forty-three percent of the State's female prison population, despite making up roughly only fifteen percent of the population. 147 It is with this historical and statistical backdrop in mind that one must examine how two more Black women-the Scott Sisters-found themselves in a Mississippi state prison.
C. The Scott Sisters
Jamie and Gladys Scott, then twenty-one and nineteen, respectively, were convicted as the masterminds behind a Christmas Eve 1993 armed robbery. 148 No one was hurt during the commission of the robbery, which 141. Id.
142.
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In 1968, the rate of female incarceration was 6 per 100,000. Id. In 2010, the rate was 67 per 100,000. Id.
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See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., 'So Utterly Inhumane,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, http://www. nytimes.com/2010/10/12/opinion/12herbert.html. The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] netted between $11 and $ 200. 149 Prior to that time, neither sister had a criminal record as well.
150
Authorities accused Jamie and Gladys of luring two male acquaintances to a secluded area where three teenaged boys, allegedly in league with the Scott sisters, robbed them. 151 The teens all claimed that Jamie and Gladys planned the robbery.
152 Jamie and Gladys tell a different story: that they caught a ride with two men after their own car would not start, but got out of the car when the men made unwanted sexual advances toward them.
153
Jamie and Gladys claimed not to have known that the men with whom they had been riding had been followed by the teenage boys or that they were going to be robbed.
154
Although the teenage boys did not implicate Jamie and Gladys in their initial statements to the police, the jury believed the prosecution's assertion that Jamie and Gladys had orchestrated the robbery.
155 As a result, each sister was convicted and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison.
156 Their three male accomplices, on the other hand, were spared long jail sentences.
157 Two of the three teens testified against the Scott Sisters at trial.
158 Those two teens served approximately three years in prison. 159 The third boy recanted, testifying that authorities had threatened that, if he did not testify that Jamie and Gladys were behind the robbery, they would send him to Parchman prison where they said he would surely be raped. 160 He was released on parole in 2006.
161
Officials never explained why Jamie and Gladys received such harsh
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sentences. 162 The only explanation for their sentences was that offered by their mother, Evelyn Rasco, who surmised that the sentences were retribution exacted against her family due to earlier testimony by family members against a corrupt Scott County sheriff. 163 There is also speculation that the sisters' sentences were graver than the teens who actually robbed the victims because the judge believed Jamie and Gladys organized the crime. 164 However, in Mississippi, only juries can impose a life sentence for a robbery. 165 The sisters' current attorney of record, Chokwe Lumumba (who did not represent them at trial), noted that, "[i]n the majority of robbery cases, even the ones that are somewhat nasty, . Indeed, Ken Turner, the district attorney who prosecuted the case, admitted that, "[n]ormally, life sentences are only returned when it is a grisly case, and this case wasn't particularly grisly."
167 Nevertheless, he has offered no explanation as to why the life sentence option was included in the jury instructions.
168 He does, however, admit that the life sentences meted out to the Scott Sisters were atypical and agreed that reducing their sentences would have been "appropriate."
169 Eventually, even Governor Haley Barbour admitted that the sisters' life sentences were "unusually long."
170
D. Haley Barbour, "The Boy from Yazoo City"
171
Haley Barbour is the most celebrated native son of Yazoo City-the principal town and seat of government of Yazoo County, Mississippi-on the southern edge of the state's Delta region. 172 As historically known, the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta is the land of fertile alluvial plains, generations of 162.
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rich, white planters and the poor descendants of African slaves. 173 More than any other region of Mississippi, it is steeped in Mississippi's antebellum past and more than any other recent Mississippi politician, Haley Barbour is steeped in the culture and lore of the Delta. 174 Barbour is not just a son of the Delta, but a scion of Mississippi politics.
175 His great-great-great-greatgrandfather Walter Leake was the first United States senator from Mississippi, after it gained statehood in 1817, and served as its third governor from 1822-1825. 176 His paternal grandfather was a judge. 177 His older brother was elected mayor of Yazoo City while Barbour was in college. 178 The Barbour family even claims descent from the Choctaw chief Greenwood Leflore, who served in the Mississippi State Senate in the mid1800s.
179
In the fall of 2010, Barbour was the president of the Republican Governors' Association and a successful former Republican National Committee chairman.
180 As such, he was widely regarded as a likely contender for the GOP presidential nomination.
181 However, some National Republican leaders and political observers were concerned that Barbour, as a white conservative from Mississippi, might be "too Southern" for the national stage-implying that either his actual racial politics or others' perceptions of the historic racial climate in Mississippi might hinder any national candidacy.
182 By the winter of 2010, Barbour had proved the pundits right. He was quoted in December of that year in the conservative magazine The Weekly Standard as saying about the Civil Rights Era: "I just 173 .
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As head of the Republican Governors' Association, Barbour orchestrated a near sweep of gubernatorial races in November 2010. Id. at 20. Prior to that, while serving as the Republican National Committee chairman from 1993-1997, Barbour spearheaded the 1994 Republican retake of the majority in the House of Representatives. Id.
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don't remember it as being that bad." 183 In the same interview, he went on to praise the members of the segregationist White Citizens' Council as peacekeepers and credited them with uneventful desegregation of the schools in his hometown of Yazoo City.
184 Barbour later released a statement calling segregation and the Citizens' Council "indefensible."
185
His original statement, however, was the beginning of the end of Barbour's moment in the spotlight as a potential GOP contender. 186 As 2011 approached, he attempted to rehabilitate his reputation regarding civil rights and racial equality by announcing a celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Freedom Rides, 187 calling for a civil rights museum in the state capital of Jackson, 188 and by finally agreeing to free the Scott Sisters.
189
Although Jamie and Gladys Scott had originally petitioned for a pardon from the Governor, what they ultimately received was an indefinite suspension of their sentences, the functional equivalent of parole.
190 They are, therefore, required to report monthly to a parole officer, secure judicial permission before traveling, refrain from associating with others who have criminal records, and pay a monthly fee of fifty-two dollars each for the cost of their supervision.
191 After having been released from prison, the Scott Sisters again petitioned Governor Barbour for a full pardon. 192 In early April 2011, Barbour indicated that he would deny that and any future pardon 183.
Ferguson, supra note 91, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184.
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Gov Race & Justice [16:2013] requests from the Scott Sisters. 193 The sisters' supporters vowed to make their pardon an issue should Barbour attempt to run for the presidency.
194 By April's end, however, Barbour had announced that he would not seek his party's nomination for the office of president. 195 Barbour, who was termlimited as governor, 196 no longer needed to improve his local or national image. Barring political expediency, the Scott Sisters had nothing to offer Barbour. Their interests were no longer convergent. 197 
III. LESSENING COERCION, MITIGATION OF THE "YUCK FACTOR"
This Part sketches the framework of a program for inmate organ donation. This framework is conceived as an adaptation of Professor Bell's interest convergence theory that realigns the interests of proposed inmate donors with those of the patients on the organ transplant waiting list. In proposing this realignment, this Part examines the historical context of the exchange of inmate biological material for liberty.
A. Interest Convergence in the Inmate Organ Donation Context
Professor Bell's model of interest convergence can be applied beyond the struggle for racial equality to other scenarios where the interests of the relatively powerless and those of the relatively powerful align to create a moment of opportunity for the disadvantaged party to advance its cause. The interest convergence in the Scott/Barbour case-Jamie's dire medical need with Barbour's political aspirations-serves to heighten the "yuck factor" experienced by individuals outside of the Scott/Barbour story (bioethicists and the national media), while engendering no such response from the narrative's actors (Barbour, Jamie and Gladys Scott, and the NAACP). Variation in the level-or existence-of repugnance notwithstanding, it is possible to conceive of interests wholly lacking in a "yuck factor" response that converge with inmates' interests in securing freedom, namely those of the patients waiting for organ transplants. As such, by adapting Bell's interest convergence model to the interests of inmates as they converge with those of the individuals awaiting transplants, 198 one can argue that such convergence lends support to the creation of an inmate organ donation program.
Those in favor of keeping NOTA intact argue that preventing the trading of organs for valuable consideration protects the most vulnerable members of society-among them the poor and minorities-from becoming mere organ farms for the ailing wealthy. 199 Other proponents claim that NOTA's prohibition is in keeping with our country's longstanding tradition of altruistic organ donations. 200 NOTA, however, was not initially conceived as anti-incentive. 201 In fact, NOTA's main proponent, Representative Al Gore, Jr. of Tennessee, initially considered the use of incentives and only backed away from their use after Congressional hearings exposed fears of exploitation fostered by private organ markets. 202 However, in the context of the overwhelming numbers of patients lingering and dying on the transplant waiting list, a policy of strict altruistic organ donations is outmoded. Instead, a narrow and tightly-regulated market, as an exception to NOTA, may prove extremely beneficial to both prisoners and patients. We have considered shortages and the needs of patients in inmate donation programs before in 132 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] this country. The surprising level of acceptance of kidney clemency for Gladys Scott may indicate that this is the time to reinstitute and expand such programs.
B. Blood-Time and the Case Against Coercion
Exchanges involving inmates' biological materials for liberty are not novel. Beginning in the 1950s, in response to blood plasma shortages, a number of states enacted statutes that created what came to be known as "blood-time" programs under which inmates who donated blood were awarded good-time credit, thereby reducing their sentences. 203 While some states have maintained their blood-time programs, 204 many of these programs were discontinued in the 1980s as blood supplies became tainted by HIV-infected plasma. 205 Despite advances in blood screening technology, the discontinued state prison blood-time programs have not been reinstituted. However, it must be noted that while such programs were in place, there was no criticism lodged against them that in any way mirrored the arguments against organ donation-based sentence reduction programs. Rather, they were discontinued for purely medical reasons and in some cases, reinstated as donation programs without the time credit component and with limitations designed to ensure that only the healthiest inmates were eligible to donate. 206 Blood is not a prohibited "human organ" under NOTA.
207 Despite blood's not being classified as a "human organ," analogizing blood-time programs with a proposed "organ-time" program is not unhelpful. Rather, one can use the former blood-time programs to illustrate the historical willingness of the criminal justice system to bargain with prisoners on terms that include bodily products in exchange for liberty. The argument can be made that blood, unlike the organs enumerated in NOTA, is regenerative (bone marrow excepted).
208 This Article proposes, however, that the standard should not be regeneration, but the criminal justice system's ability to orchestrate a scheme under which an incentivized organ exchange will not be deemed coercive.
Traditionally, coercion involves the threat that an unfavorable change in circumstances will occur if the coercee does not take the action desired by the coercer.
209 Thus, without a conditional threat, coercion cannot be said to exist. In the case of a proposed inmate donation program, the State would not be threatening to punish an inmate by unfavorably changing his circumstances if he chooses not to donate. Rather, it would only be offering to favorably change the circumstances of those who did choose to participate. Thus, rather than a conditional threat, the program would consist of a conditional offer and would, therefore not meet the definition of coercion. 210 A prisoner who did not participate would be no worse off with regard to the length of her sentence or the circumstances of her confinement than before the offer to participate was made. In mitigating coercion, it is therefore, important to refrain from framing the inmate's donation as the State's exacting retribution for the inmate's crimes.
211 Donation, in lieu of confinement, should not be offered as part of a plea arrangement or as part example, California continues to allow its prisoners to donate provided that they submit to an examination by a physician and limit their donations to once per seventy-two days. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4351 (2011). One scholar reasoned that prisoners may continue to volunteer to donate blood without the promise of blood-time in the hope of favorably impressing the parole board. See Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439, 441 n.13 (1972) .
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But see Mark F. Anderson, The Prisoner as Organ Donor, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951, 964 (2000) (envisioning that the emphasis of any inmate organ donation program will "be on the fact that the prisoners are paying society and not that society is paying the prisoners"). The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] of the sentence, 212 or as the condition of release as in the Gladys Scott case. Rather, the inmate must be free to choose or reject donation, such a choice being made after careful, studied consideration. The program outlined in Part III.C. below seeks to instill such autonomous decision-making.
There still remains the question of whether, if not coercive, the offer of liberty in exchange for an organ represents an "undue inducement"-one in which the thing offered, liberty, is so attractive that a prisoner's ability to make an autonomous decision would be overridden such that she would disregard her better judgment and donate an organ to obtain that liberty.
213
The danger of undue inducement, like that of coercion, can be overcome by creating an environment in which the proposed inmate donor can gather facts sufficient to develop informed consent to donate.
C. A Proposal for an Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty
This Article proposes that an inmate organ donation program should consist of five components: (1) screening; (2) donor education; (3) donation and release; (4) post-operative care and follow up; and (5) continued outreach and education. In addition, such a program should include protective measures, such as provisions for judicial oversight. Finally, the program should be structured so as to avoid placing inmates in a position where eschewing the donation program can worsen their circumstances.
Recent scholarship has documented the historical mistreatment of vulnerable populations, particularly Blacks, by the healthcare system. 214 This mistreatment has taken various forms, including the lack of access to healthcare, substandard care, and nonconsensual experimentation. Critics may argue that any proposals to elicit informed consent from inmates for organ/time exchange programs could eventually be utilized to abuse another vulnerable population, prison inmates, much as Blacks were abused by the healthcare system. Once established in the area of organ donation, informed consent could be applied to situations involving medical experimentation, including drug trials and experimental procedures. However, the proposal contained herein solely advocates creating a narrow exception to the
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213.
The established organ donation regime as codified in NOTA, not authorizing the targeting of prison populations for medical experimentation. As such, this proposal, with the following steps, advocates the usage of conventional medical techniques in organ procurement and transplantation and merely seeks a novel solution to the current legal obstacle imposed by NOTA.
Screening
Inmates who express an interest in donating an organ would undergo screening to determine their eligibility for the program. Screening would assess the candidate's suitability for the program from both a penological and medical standpoint. Jurisdictions adopting an inmate donation program may want to limit the program by type of conviction, length of sentence (or remaining length), or other factors. Medical screening would aim to discover those with communicable diseases, medical conditions contraindicating donation, or those whose organs are otherwise unsuitable for transplant. Such inmates would be rejected as program candidates. An inmate being rejected from the program for reasons of poor health and, therefore, being unable to avail herself of the benefit being offered to healthy inmates may, admittedly, seem unfair. As a means of mitigating the result of rejection, any inmate who agrees to undergo screening and participate in the educational process (as described below) would receive modest credit toward release.
A screening regimen would make it impossible for an inmate to misrepresent her eligibility to donate. Such a regimen would also serve to expand donor registries, such as the bone marrow registry. It is anticipated that some inmates who are not rejected for medical reasons may still selfselect out of the program at a later point. However, there remains the possibility that even post-release, they may be identified as a match for a particular candidate and may choose to make a donation at that time. In the case of bone marrow, it is likely that an inmate who registers now may not be called upon to donate until some point in the future.
Donor Education
While medical screening is ongoing, potential inmate donors will undergo some months of patient education in order to advise them of the need for donation, the process of donating, and the potential risks involved. The aims of such education would be twofold: (1) to obtain informed consent from the potential donor and (2) to extend the timeline between acceptance into the program and actual donation. The purpose of lengthening the time between acceptance and donation is to lessen any pressure that an inmate may feel to donate immediately by actually The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] removing the option of immediate donation. 215 The attenuated timeline reduces desperation and, thus, the appearance of undue inducement.
216 A longer education timeline will also give ample opportunity for potential donors to opt out of the program as they gain knowledge regarding the donation process and risks. Again, an inmate would receive credit toward release for time spent in the education phase of the program. 
Donation and Release
After completing the months-long screening and donor education process, a candidate would appear before a judge in order to be cleared to donate and to be released from prison. Such a hearing would be designed to confirm informed consent and the absence of coercion. Donation would take place in a public or private hospital under the care of the same transplant surgeons that care for non-inmate donors. The State and the recipients' insurer would be responsible for medical costs. Upon completion of the surgery, the donor would no longer be deemed to be in state custody.
Post-Operative Care and Follow Up
As part of the program, a donating former inmate would be entitled to post-operative care in the hospital and to follow up care after discharge. Such follow up care would take the place of normal parole or probation obligations. It would last as long as necessary for full recuperation, as determined by the former inmate's doctors.
Continued Outreach and Education
The final phase of the program would be optional for the former inmate. In this phase, she would be provided with additional education and would have the opportunity to participate in community outreach programs aimed at increasing organ donors. It is anticipated that participating states would devise measures to provide training and possibly employment to inmates choosing continued participation.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Scott Sisters' case is illustrative of a classically repugnant exchange in which coercion, coupled with political expediency, played a major role. This example, however, does not have to be the model for an inmate organ-liberty exchange. Instead, we can adapt Professor Derrick Bell's interest convergence model to apply to the alignment of the interests of inmates with those of transplant hopefuls. 218 Further, by providing inmates with patient education and opportunities to opt out without adverse consequences, it may be possible to create a program under which such exchanges would not trigger a "yuck factor" response.
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